Creating a Frontier War: Harrison, Prophetstown, and the War of 1812.

Patrick Bottiger, Ph.D., pbottiger@fgcu.edu

Most scholars would agree that the frontier was a violent place. But only recently have academics begun to examine the extent to which frontier settlers used violence as a way to empower themselves and to protect their interests. Moreover, when historians do talk about violence, they typically frame it as the by-product of American nationalism and expansion. For them, violence is the logical result of the American nation state’s dispossessing American Indians of their lands. Perhaps one of the most striking representations of the violent transition from frontier to nation state is that of Indiana Territory’s contested spaces. While many scholars see this violence as the logical conclusion to Anglo-American expansionist aims, I argue that marginalized French, Miamis, and even American communities created a frontier atmosphere conducive to violence (such as that at the Battle of Tippecanoe) as a means to empower their own agendas. Harrison found himself backed into a corner created by the self-serving interests of Miami, French, and American factions, but also Harrison own efforts to save his job. The question today is not if Harrison took command, but why he did so.

The arrival of the Shawnee Prophet and his band of nativists forced the French and Miamis to take overt action against Prophetstown. Furious that the Shawnee Prophet established his community in the heart of Miami territory, the French and Miamis quickly identified the Prophet as a threat to regional stability. By amplifying the threat he posed to the security of American settlements, the Miami and French effectively won an ally against a group that threatened Miami hegemony. By spreading false estimates of Prophetstown’s strength and ambitions, the Miami and French slowly shaped American policy towards nativist Indians. Convincing the Americans to attack Prophetstown became all the more easy when the Americans
themselves factionalized over slavery and chose to argue about Prophetstown rather than continue to petition the federal government to intervene. The pro-slavery Harrisonians (who allied themselves with their namesake, Indiana Territory’s Governor William Henry Harrison) attacked their anti-slavery opponents by associating them with the “demonic” Prophet. In doing so, they contributed to a larger and pervasive paranoia about Prophetstown which polarized both the diplomatic and social atmosphere in the territory. Factionalism within Indian communities reinforced these fears. When factions of the Miami resisted American advances, and factions of the Prophetstown community attacked each other and white settlements, the Americans believed that such behavior proved the Prophet’s militant ambitions. Trapped by the polarizing rhetoric and ethnic factionalism, Harrison seized command and marched against the Prophet.

William Wells hated the Prophet long before Tenskwatawa settled Prophetstown. As the son-in-law of Miami leader Little Turtle and a key figure in regional diplomacy, Wells was suspicious of the Shawnee leader from the moment the Prophet went “religiously mad.” As early as 1807, Wells informed Governor Harrison that the “Prophet should be removed” from Greenville, Ohio because the Prophet had caused such fervor among the Indians there. Wells’s position as Fort Wayne Indian agent allowed him to influence Harrison by manipulating Tenskwatawa’s comments about Indians and Euro-Americans. When Tenskwatawa moved to Indiana Territory in 1808, Wells told Harrison that the Shawnee leader “should be the first object of our resentment.” Wells even suggested that Harrison “[s]tarve all those” who followed the Prophet. As the Prophet would do many times, he leapt to defend his name. Tenskwatawa made it clear to Harrison that he wanted to “live in peace and friendship” with the Americans. Like the whites, the Indians were farmers who possessed a deep religious faith. Tenskwatawa also
claimed that the Euro-Americans and Indians shared a racial heritage; they were created by the same being even though the two differed “a little in colour.”

But Wells did not believe one word that the Prophet said. Like many of his kin, Wells feared that Tenskwatawa’s militant politics would upset regional stability and displace the Miamis. Having lost their cultural capital at Kekionga after the Battle of Fallen Timbers, the Miamis were threatened by various Indian communities that had migrated into the area and participated in treaty negotiations to access trade goods and annuity payments. The destruction of Kekionga and rise of Prophetstown not only represented a regional power shift by reorienting Indian migration to the Tippecanoe; it also represented a danger to the cultural identity of the Miamis who had used Kekionga to enable their hegemony. Also, by 1808, the Kickapoos and Americans had displaced the Miamis from their settlements along the Vermillion River and at Vincennes. The Miamis feared that the Prophet would soon do the same. The Kickapoos and Potawatomis began legitimizing their presence in the region by signing land cession treaties rather than operate within the hegemonic boundaries established by the Miamis.1 Identity had always been bound to place; in talking to C.C. Trowbridge, the Miamis emphasized geographical markers. But now lands could be bought and sold, just like furs. As a result, the foundations of community were divorced from the earth. The Miamis despised the Prophet’s intrusion into the complex political affairs of the region because his rhetoric polarized relationships between Indians and non-Indians. The Miamis had used the British, the French, and Indians to amplify their economic and political influence during the previous decades; they feared that the Prophet’s rhetoric would ruin relationships with non-Indians.

At the root of the animosity between the Prophet and the Miamis lay a fundamental difference in what it meant to be Indian. Tenskwatawa demanded that Indians unify under his
leadership focused on shared Indiannness rather than unique cultural histories. Such a belief was the product of Tenskwatawa’s nativist ideals, but it was also uniquely Shawnee. Unlike the Miamis, Shawnee creation stories reflected an itinerant identity and a malleable sense of place due to their constant displacement and migration. The Shawnees learned to maintain their “distinctiveness through beliefs and practices that were not linked to place and that could be sustained in a wide variety of geographic contexts.” The Shawnees’ diasporic history involved frequent moves in order to access trade and to solidify diplomatic relationships. By the early 1800s, you could find Shawnee communities from Ohio to Missouri. The Miamis, by consensus, had protected their settlements and interests by controlling an important trade portage between the Wabash and Maumee rivers and by accommodating outsiders in order to access their trade goods. Thus, they perfected a system that forced outsiders to adjust their interests and migrate to Miami country, which enabled the Miamis to remain relatively sedentary.² The Shawnees could remain culturally Shawnee even if their mission at Prophetstown failed and they were forced to move. The Miamis could not do the same without risking a terrible social crisis.

William Wells remained devoted to his faction’s interests. His actions were the product of a desire to protect American expansionism, and also a result of his cultural and familial ties to the Miamis. Wells took advantage of his diplomatic position to fill Harrison’s ear with rumors. In the spring of 1809, he warned Harrison that many Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Pottawatomi Indians had fled Prophetstown because Tenskwatawa “told them to receive the Tomahawk … and destroy all the white people at Vincennes.” Yet Wells reassured Harrison that he did not believe that the Prophet meant whites any harm.³ Wells’s conflicting advice hid deep-seated emotions about the Prophet’s community; his letters to Harrison, while ostensibly impartial, were meant to sow doubt and insecurity.
In letters to Harrison, Wells juxtaposed observations that the Prophet “only wanted power” with descriptions of starving Indians who abandoned Prophetstown. When Wells distributed rations to those who left the settlement, he told the governor that humanity compelled him to do so. But Wells’s real motive – keeping Indians away from Prophetstown – served instead to check Tenskwatawa’s growing popularity and to empower Wells’s Miami polity. Wells’s efforts to defend his influence applied to his fellow Miamis as well. At one point he informed Harrison that a Wea chief named Lapoussier should “be suspected” of aiding the Prophet even before Tenskwatawa had settled in Indiana Territory. Even though Harrison recognized Wells’s duplicity and “disposition for intrigue,” he continued to rely on the Indian agent to distribute annuity payments to Indians. Harrison firmly believed that “the qualifications he [Wells] possessed” as Indian agent “could not be found in any other individual,” but Harrison also feared that if he did not continue to employ Wells, “every measure of the Government will be opposed & thwarted by himself & [Little Turtle].” Damned either way, Harrison retained Wells.

French traders compounded Tenskwatawa’s frustrations by echoing Wells’s accusations, for it was in the best interests of the French to act out against Prophetstown. Ever since 1732, the French had developed a lucrative trading network with their Indian neighbors and relatives. Now, the Prophet’s policies threatened to end this trade and leave the French with few economic opportunities in the region. He banned the cession of lands by any Indian who lacked unanimous consent among the various Indian tribes and restricted, if not prevented, trade between Indians and Euroamericans. Moreover, the French worried that native people were not the only target of American territorial expansion. Since the mid-1780s, Americans had made concerted efforts (in the form of higher taxes) to remove the French from their lands in order to capitalize on the
nearby fertile fields and the profitable trade networks the French had created with the Indians. The increased tax burden forced several French families to move out of the area; other French residents feared ruin if they defaulted on their taxes. Unhappy with public officials who were unresponsive to their needs, the French expressed their “deep regret and chagrin” toward the elected officials for whom they had voted and trusted.5

If a lack of political voice were not enough, the Americans began auctioning off French property when the Frenchmen failed to pay their taxes. Confusing tax codes amplified by a language barrier prevented most French residents from understanding the laws in the first place. Land seizures coupled with the cultural differences added to the bitter feelings of the French. In effect, the tax laws guaranteed that the pluralistic community of Vincennes remained segregated by ethnicity. To make matters worse, most Frenchmen blamed the American presence for the drastic increase in Indian violence. In fact, most French routinely socialized with their Indian friends and family members—a custom which the Americans abhorred. For the French, there was little security in American policies that forced them to either abandon their homes or their traditions in order to survive in Indiana Territory. To make matters worse, most French residents blamed the American presence for the drastic increase in Indian violence. In fact, most French routinely socialized with their Indian friends and family members—a custom which the Americans abhorred. Thus the Miamis and French sought out new opportunities to protect themselves.6 Their choices were much like those of the nearby Indians - adapt or move.

One historian concludes that there was “a certain self-serving persistence in French attitudes” in Vincennes, a point shown by the experiences of Michel Brouillet. Brouillet’s father had held commissions as both a British and American officer and routinely used imperial powers to the advantage of the French community. Brouillet’s first wife was a Miami woman and their
son, Jean Baptiste Brouillet, became a Miami leader. Although Brouillet eventually married a French woman, he probably maintained connections with his Metis son in order to further his contacts with traders. Several other French traders had varied allegiances (many of whom were providing intelligence to Harrison)

Toussaint Dubois – trading store in Vincennes and central to the Lasselle trade network

Peter Lafontaine had moved from Detroit to trade among the Miamis and even married a Miami woman

Joseph Baron – married a Piankashaw woman

Hyacinthe (born at Kekionga), uncle Antoine Lasselle (British loyalist)

Harrison recognized the ulterior motives of the French interpreters when he wrote to Secretary of War William Eustis that “nine tenths of them prefer the interests of the Indians to that of their employers.” Yet Harrison failed to recognize how much the French shaped regional diplomacy to their advantage.

When reports surfaced in 1809 that the Prophet had failed to unify local Indian communities, the French made sure to speak of his settlement as a menace. In their own series of lies and half-truths, the French spread false intelligence about Prophetstown. That spring, two Indian traders reported that the Indians associated with the Prophet had left Prophetstown after the mysterious murder of an Indian woman. Harrison considered reversing an earlier decision to call out two companies of the militia, but he wanted to hear “something decisive” from Governor Meriwether Lewis. Two French traders, Peter Lafontaine and Toussaint Dubois, told Harrison that the Prophet had nearly 500 supporters “within the distance of 40 or 50 miles of his Village.” Such an estimate ignored long-standing factionalism; groups of Miamis and Potawatomis lived
within twenty-five miles of Prophetstown but had little or no connection with the settlement. One Potawatomi leader, Winamac, lived nearby and spoke out against Prophetstown but was eventually ostracized from visiting. Five Medals warned that having the Prophet so near to his villages would undoubtedly upset regional stability. Yet Lafontaine told Harrison that the Prophet “determined to commence hostilities” in order to “sweep all the white people from the Wabash and White River” and then attack the Miamis.” Such phrases were repeated time and again, always pointing towards Vincennes and its white denizens.

Toussaint Dubois, an interpreter with strong connections to the Miamis, also used the story of Prophetstown’s decline to his advantage. He revealed that the Ottawas and Ojibwas had not defected from Prophetstown after a murder had taken place there. In order to test the power of the Prophet, some Ojibwas and Ottawas had killed an Indian in town to challenge Tenskwatawa’s warning that the Master of Life would punish any violent behavior. Dubois argued that some of the Prophet’s followers had actually committed the murder in order to “carry on the deception” that Tenskwatawa was losing control over his people. The homicide would “prevent [non-natives] from taking the alarm” at the force that Tenskwatawa gathered. Yet according to other observers, “it was not the common impression…that [the Prophet’s] doctrines had any tendency to unite [the Indians at Prophetstown].” Despite intelligence that showed Prophetstown to be in disarray, French traders remained adamant that the rumors of factionalism along the Tippecanoe River were only an elaborate ruse designed to hide the town’s true militancy. As with Lafontaine and Brouillet, Dubois’ motives for exaggerating the situation at Prophetstown were likely a product of his French interests.

Harrison did dismiss Michelle Brouillet for providing faulty intelligence, yet on the whole, Brouillet’s commentary, like that of Wells, reinforced Harrison’s suspicions that the
Prophet and his settlement were focused on destroying whites. In fact, despite firing Brouillet, Harrison employed him again in 1811, even sending him to gather intelligence on Prophetstown. The interpreters’ estimate of the number of warriors at Prophetstown amplified its militant character in Harrison’s mind, as well as the mind of the Secretary of War, to whom Harrison forwarded his reports. Population estimates were immensely important given that Vincennes had less than 1,000 residents. As a result, Harrison continued to train the militia despite being convinced that the Prophet would “not dare attack.” Such behavior not only reflected Harrison’s state of mind, but played an important part in reinforcing a belief among local inhabitants that there was indeed something to fear.

Furthermore, although go-betweens such as William Wells, Little Turtle, and the French traders were a threat to American hegemony, Harrison relied on them because he refused to let the ulterior motives of his intelligence gatherers to undermine his governance. Moreover, Harrison was truly convinced that the Prophet “intended hostilities” and “wicked designs.” As a result, Harrison mobilized his resources to “ascertain how far the disaffection may have extended amongst the tribes” by ordering Johnston to send a delegation “from all the friendly tribes” to Prophetstown. Doing so placed him right in the hands of the French and Miamis who were more than willing to shape the intelligence Harrison received.

Tenskwatawa reacted strongly to the accusations that Prophetstown was seething with violence and becoming increasingly unstable. He recognized that building a vibrant community at Prophetstown was as much about controlling the perceptions of his town as it was about securing the loyalty of Indian converts. In May 1809, he traveled to Fort Wayne to beg John Johnston, the Indian agent at Fort Wayne, to recognize Little Turtle’s “private and personal motives” for protecting his small community of Miami followers. The Prophet discussed the
charges against him, saying that Wells and Little Turtle “were the authors of the reports that went out against him.” After questioning a number of local Indians, Johnston could not “find that there existed any grounds for the alarm.” Instead, Johnston concluded that Wells had caused “the alarm…to bring Governor Harrison into the measure by calling out the militia.”

Johnston decided that Tenskwatawa was right. He already disliked Wells, whom Secretary of War Henry Dearborn had recently dismissed as Indian agent. Wells abused his power as Indian agent, cheating native people and keeping the profits from illegal whisky sales to himself. While Edmunds argues that the Prophet was “able to beguile the inexperienced Johnston” and hide his true intentions, the Prophet’s motives were simply not that sinister. Wells’s motives appear equally underhanded, given his history of abusing power, coupled with his father-in-law’s (Little Turtle) fear of being displaced by the Prophet. But, Harrison played right into Wells’s hand by calling out the militia, which reinforced the growing public alarm over Prophetstown.

In Vincennes, the local paper took note of the fearful and anti-Indian atmosphere; in turn, these issues spilled into the public debate, and all at a time when Harrison was already combating challenges to his leadership. The editor of Vincennes’s newspaper *The Western Sun* published several articles during late spring and early summer detailing the possibility of an “Indian War.” That was exactly what Wells wanted the Americans and Harrison to fear. Harrison believed that the Shawnee leader would eventually abandon his mission once he saw the whites who were swarming to Indiana Territory. In turn, Harrison hoped that the increased pressures brought on the Prophet would convince other Indian communities to cede more lands to the Americans.

Harrison began organizing a council in Fort Wayne to that very end. In the summer of 1809, factions of Delawares, Miamis, Eel River, and Potowatomi Indians gathered at Fort Wayne
to negotiate a major treaty. Little Turtle’s Miamis supported the treaty but were strongly rebuffed by factions of the Miamis (Pacanne’s group) who refused to cede any more lands. In fact, “parties of young men of the Miami Tribe were constantly arriving [sic] loaded with goods from the British Agents at Malden” rather than collaborate with the Americans. Their travels to Malden made clear the divisions that pulled at the Miami polity, and also proved their attempts to reaffirm historical relationships with the British. Eventually, the Miami factions signed the treaty because they realized that they could not allow Little Turtle to use the treaty to define himself as the Miamis’ sole representative. Similarly, Miami leader Pacanne, an adversary of Little Turtle and his son William Wells, signed the treaty in order to affirm his identity as a prominent leader. The treaty resulted in the cession of more than two and one half million acres of land. More important, it amplified the factionalism already present in the region, which had a direct connection to the increasingly negative perception of the Prophet and his town. The Miamis used the treaty to benefit themselves, but non-Indians continued to interpret the divisions within Miami society as the creation of outside forces (such as the Prophet) rather than of the result of internal dynamics.14

American negotiators misunderstood Pacanne’s frustration over the Treaty of Fort Wayne, which benefited a selected few; they assumed that he favored resistance (and even militancy). The devastating effects of the treaty also compelled groups like the Potawatomis and Kickapoos to look towards Prophetstown when they realized that Harrison would no longer recognize them.15 In the same way, Pacanne’s signature on the Treaty of Fort Wayne allowed him to assert his identity as a Miami leader. Nonetheless, most European Americans interpreted the actions of Pacanne’s Miamis, the Potawatomis, and Kickapoos as another example of Tenskwatawa’s growing influence over disaffected Indians and not a result of the consequences
from the treaty itself. It was typical for informants (who were often French or Miamis) to frame the information they received through the Prophetstown/Vincennes dichotomy. One trader reported to Harrison that at least one Miami leader “had entered into all the views of the Prophet and even that of murdering all those who stand in opposition to his measures.” The report also mentioned that an important but unnamed Miami leader who had visited the British fort at Malden and received gifts that renewed his community’s long-standing relationship with the British. Furthermore, British goods were cheaper than those sold by the French. The disaffected Miami leader used the British to protect his community’s interests and did not intend to place himself and his people entirely at the Prophet’s bidding or at the American’s.16

Pacanne’s Miamis, while protesting the treaty, refused to subvert their desires to satisfy Teskwatawa’s nativist goals. Few outsiders recognized this. Gregory Dowd and R. David Edmunds have identified this treaty as an important juncture – one where Tecumseh began to transform his brother’s religious revival into a pan-Indian movement. While this is true, the treaty also served as a catalyst that prodded the Miamis to lash out against Prophetstown and the Americans. Both developments fused together to create a popular perception that the Prophet and his brother were plotting for war.

Prophetstown continued to grow, but it was not nearly as unified as the Americans feared. The Indian groups at Prophetstown were trapped between the Prophet’s more rigid ideology, which centered on a singular Indian identity, and their more traditional ethnic identities, which they had fashioned over the previous decades. Conflicting ethnic interests likely led to violence between the Prophet’s followers during the fall of October 1810 when Ho-Chunks murdered some Kickapoos and Sauk Indians. Harrison believed this sort of violence reflected “the declining influence of the Prophet’s party” and hoped that the “jealousy” among the Prophet’s
followers would “completely dissolve the confederacy he had formed.” As usual, a Miami Indian arrived in Vincennes to contradict the story and assure Harrison that the Prophet “absolutely meditated an immediate attack upon [Vincennes].”

This tendency to compartmentalize Indian behavior in one of two ways – separatism or acculturation - overshadows the complexities of Indian actions in the Wabash-Maumee Valley. One scholar, Robert Mann, has looked beyond the categories of “accommodationist” and “nativist” in order to better define the place of Euro-Americans within Indian country. Mann’s analysis of Pacanne identifies the factions among the Miamis as either “progressive” or “conservative” and characterizes the conservative Miamis as “bound by their adherence to an ethnic ideology.”

Mann concludes that like the Prophet’s ideology, conservative Miamis beliefs were not necessarily looking backwards or geared toward restoring a golden age. Rather, it is clear that the Miamis hoped to renew and protect their ethnic identity during a period of great change. Mann’s labeling of the Miamis as either progressive or traditional is problematic because it traps the Miami factions within a strict dichotomy. This sort of framework is reductive because it erases the varied motivations of Indians in the Ohio River Valley and replaces them with worldviews that are not their own. Yet, Mann’s contextualization of Miami factionalism as a product of intra-ethnic disputes is beneficial because it demonstrates that the Miamis were shaped more by relations with each other than by relations with Euro-Americans. By narrowing our focus to the community level, we move beyond the imposed simplicity of labels and understand Indians in the ways they understood themselves.

Pacanne’s efforts to protect Miami interests resembled the Prophet’s actions all too closely. Yet, rather than turn his support toward the Prophet, Pacanne traveled to Malden in order to re-establish relationships with the British. Since Malden was the same place that the
Prophet and his brother purchased trade goods and ammunition, increasing numbers of Americans erroneously believed that Pacanne’s actions reflected his support of Prophetstown and Tenskwatawa’s nativist agenda. Yet Tenskwatawa hoped to use the trade goods to protect all Indians by unifying them in a pan-Indian confederacy and Pacanne wanted to renew Miami power and ethnic identity. The Prophet’s vision worried Americans because it demanded the unification of many more thousands of Indians in the name of a common (and anti-American) cause. But for Americans, seeking the support of the British and advocating unity among the North American Indian community meant the same thing.

The growing violence along the frontier forced settlers to act rashly. It was easier for the Americans to associate Pacanne with the Prophet than it was for the Americans to understand the complex dispute between Pacanne and Little Turtle. In Pacanne’s eyes, Little Turtle’s efforts threatened traditional Miami culture and regional hegemony by silencing other Miami leaders and communities important to trade and diplomacy. In this sense, Little Turtle’s willingness to negotiate with Americans was no different than the Prophet’s aims. Little Turtle hurt the Miamis by willingly ceding Miami lands in order to gain annuity payments. The Prophet angered Pacanne by settling on the Miami lands and ignoring their spiritual significance. Miamis factions that agreed with Pacanne believed that Prophetstown posed as big a threat as did the Americans and British. It is not surprising that factions of Miamis used each group to protect their own interests. They associated with the Americans to threaten Little Turtle, traded with the British in order to maintain a degree of independence from the Americans, and then provided information to the Americans to marginalize Prophetstown. There is no doubt that some Miamis associated with the Prophet, but it is also imperative that we question the motives for these associations and not simply assume that those Miamis were nativist. If Pacanne signed a treaty
that he abhorred in order to challenge Little Turtle’s authority, then why would other Indians not associate with the Prophet to gain recognition as well?

The Prophet had no way of limiting the extent to which Americans like Harrison depended upon the Miamis for information. This dependency was especially difficult in the aftermath of the Treaty of Fort Wayne when Indians were increasingly concerned with the course of diplomacy. The reaction from the Miamis was nothing short of remarkable. Gros Bled, a Piankashaw (Miami-speaking) leader, visited Harrison personally and asked to move west of the Mississippi; he had “heard amongst the Indians nothing but the News of War.” Gros Bled told Harrison that the Prophet planned a “Massacre in the Town” and “boasted that he would follow the footsteps of the Great Pontiac.” Gros Bled’s story had the power to intimidate on its own, but in Harrison’s mind it was - coupled with Michel Brouillet’s exaggerated estimate that Prophetstown’s warrior population was near 3,000 people – just another example of the Prophet’s militancy. Brouillet’s assessment, like Gros Bled’s story, reflected efforts to rid the region of a problematic Indian leader through fear and rumor rather than legitimate threats. Brouillet’s confession proved as much. In recanting the estimate, he numbered the warriors at 650. Weeks later, residents of Indiana Territory picked up their copies of The Western Sun and read Elihu Stout’s rich description of Brouillet’s encounter with Tenskwatawa. The trader was “made to deny that he was an American” and a man transporting a salt shipment north along the Wabash had been shaken “violently by the hair” because they looked like Americans. Most important, Stout’s articles stated that Brouillet and Dubois were “to be relied upon,” that the “Miamis had agreed to attend the Prophet’s council,” and that the French had been warned to leave the town before the slaughter started.21
Stout continued to publish editorials that reminded the Vincennes residents that “the Prophet had been preparing for war for a long time.” Harrison and many Americans believed that the fate of the territory depended upon the loyalty of the Miamis; they were more numerous and enjoyed a great degree of influence among the Wabash Indians. But Harrison and his agents failed to recognize the degree to which American policies and Prophetstown’s nativism had caused the Miamis to divide. Americans mistakenly concluded that the Miamis who opposed Little Turtle in turn supported the Prophet. This amplified negative perceptions that the Prophet had won many Miami converts. John Johnston, the Indian agent at Fort Wayne, noted the Mississinewa Miamis’ “reluctance” to meet with the Americans. Johnston feared “that there was mischief going on among them” and he tried in vain to “remove the existing bad impressions” they had of the Americans. In council, Miami leader Pacanne condemned the Fort Wayne Treaty and the belligerent Americans who forced the Miamis to cede lands. Pacanne remained adamant that his people “would not agree to the treaty, that it must be broke, that for their part they would not receive any part of the annuity.” Johnston believed that the Miamis were a “band of the Prophet’s followers” because “every sentiment they uttered was in unison with those of the Prophet.” An assistant Indian agent claimed that the “Miamis and Putawatamies [sic] [were] to attack Fort Wayne.” Even Harrison told Eustis that one of the Miami leaders, “a very artfull [sic] and sensible fellow, who (as a principal chief told Colo. Vigo) had entered into all of the views of the Prophet, and even that of murdering all those who should stand in opposition to his measures.”

Tensions flared when Pacanne decided to visit British headquarters near Detroit with thirty of his men. Johnston averred that Pacanne’s Miamis had been “corrupted by the Prophet’s Council.” His conclusions about the Prophet’s “contagion” echoed Harrison’s; neither
recognized the extent to which the Miami-speaking Indians had separated themselves from both the Prophet and the Americans. In fact, earlier that June, Johnston had said that he “cherish[ed] the Mississinewa chiefs,” which included Pacanne, and claimed that Little Turtle was “contemptible” and “beyond description.” More surprising was Johnston’s conclusion that the Prophet had won over Pacanne. The exact opposite had occurred. If anything, the Prophet would have wanted Pacanne to remain in the valley, for the Miami leader’s presence would exacerbate problems. Yet, Pacanne rejected the Prophet’s influence just as he had rejected the Americans.

Americans did not want to distinguish Miami factionalism from Prophetstown militancy; they were simply too fearful of what a pan-Indian confederacy might mean for their safety on the frontier. Miami leader The Owl reminded Johnston that “all the mischief that is going among” the Miamis “has sprung from Wells & the [Little] Turtle” but such declarations mattered little to the Americans who had grown obsessed with Prophetstown. Harrison disregarded Owl’s warning because the governor believed that “the Miamis have been so frightened by the threats of the Prophet” that they would likely deny the recent land cession and join Prophetstown. Harrison suspected that the Prophet was winning his fight for the Miamis, which would be “of infinite prejudice to the United States.” Americans believed that the Prophet was the root of the problem and that Pacanne was only acting in accordance with Tenskwatawa’s wishes. By stopping the Shawnee brothers, Harrison hoped to force the Miami factions to accept American terms.

In October 1810, French spies once again warned Harrison that the Prophet had gathered an imposing force, intelligence Harrison identified as “entirely a fabrication.” In fact, Harrison discovered that the Ho-Chunk, Tenskwatawa’s base of support, numbered less than one hundred;
conversely, the larger contingent of Potawatomis near Prophetstown continued to reject Tenskwatawa’s authority and wanted “to go to war” against Tenskwatawa rather “than with the Americans.” Despite evidence of trouble at Prophetstown, Harrison demanded that a fort be built north of town and that soldiers be at the ready. The Miami and French could complain about Prophetstown all they wanted, but it was Harrison who had the resources to move against it. It was Harrison who could take command.

How, then, did Miami/Shawnee/French factionalism lead to Harrison's taking the desperate step of provoking the Battle of Tippecanoe? A large part of the answer had to do with the misinformation and misunderstandings created by the French, Miamis, and Americans compounded by the clashing cultural agendas between the Prophet and the Miamis. From the moment the Prophet arrived, Little Turtle and William Wells moved to destroy him. The Miamis rankled at this Shawnee outsider, for his call to Indian unity would only take away from the Miamis' decades-long efforts to assert themselves in the Wabash valley. With every movement the Prophet made, the Miamis were there to challenge him and to accuse him of plotting to destroy the American settlements. The French played their part as well. Increasingly fearful that the Prophet might cut them off completely from the regional trade, the French demonized Tenskwatawa by using their roles as interpreters and diplomats to manipulate the intelligence about Prophetstown that flowed into Harrison’s office and influencing the public rhetoric through Stout’s *Western Sun*. As a result, they successfully created an image of Prophetstown as a militant community and direct threat to American settlements.

Prophetstown became a tool with which the Americans fought political battles, particularly when the election for territorial representative to Congress and the Treaty of Fort Wayne converged in 1809. In Vincennes, two factions battled over the legality of slavery in the
territory. These factions then fought (literally, at times) to elect their man as territorial representative to Congress. As both sides looked for new ways to attack each other, they began to argue about Harrison’s handling of Indian affairs. At the same time that Harrison tried to exploit Prophetstown, his own community was wracked with instability. This led to his ill-conceived attack on Tippecanoe.

Eventually, the debate in Vincennes evolved into an argument about Prophetstown. At one point, Harrison claimed in a speech to the General Assembly that “certain enemies of [the U.S.] residing at Vincennes” had tried to undermine the treaty negotiations at Fort Wayne. The editor of The Western Sun fueled the fire by claiming that “some abandoned profligate, in the grab of an American[,]” tried to torpedo the treaty by telling the Indians that the “President did not want the land” and that governor Harrison was only using the treaty “to retrieve his declining popularity.” As the rhetoric grew, so too did the militant image of Prophetstown. Soon Harrison and his supporters began to levy accusations at their anti-slavery enemies. They made outrageous claims, saying that a number of residents in Vincennes “had a close correspondence with the Prophet and had agreed with him upon signals designating those who were to be sacrificed & those who were to be spared.”¹ As the debate became more public, the rhetoric became more volatile. Harrison demanded that those who had spread “falsehoods amongst the Indians” be punished because they had undermined the foundations of government and peaceful society.”² He told Eustis that there were “unprincipled and designing white men” living in

¹ Badollet to Gallatin, November 13, 1809, Correspondence of John Badollet and Albert Gallatin, 114; The Western Sun, November 18, 1809; Badollet to Gallatin, September 25, 1810, Correspondence, 170; “Message of the Governor,” November 12, 1810, Thornbrough and Riker, Journals of the General Assembly of Indiana Territory, 352-355.

² Badollet to Gallatin, November 13, 1809, Correspondence of John Badollet and Albert Gallatin, 114; The Western Sun, November 18, 1809; Badollet to Gallatin, September 25, 1810, Correspondence, 170; “Message of the Governor,” November 12, 1810, Thornbrough and Riker, Journals of the General Assembly of Indiana Territory, 352-355.
Vincennes who were working with Wells. These men told the Weas to join the Prophet; Tenskwatawa could help them regain lands that had been lost with the treaty of Fort Wayne.³

Soon, Harrison was trapped within his own rhetoric, for his political enemies offered an entirely different portrayal of Prophetstown. John Badollet (head of the territorial land office) saw the prophet as a peaceful man who had settled along the Wabash in an effort to aid his people. The Indians had “cleared, fenced in and planted corn,” constructed homes, refrained from alcohol, “[gone] regularly to work every morning” and tasted “the comforts of civilized life.” Harrison’s rhetoric, according to Badollet, had incorrectly induced “a belief at Washington that the Prophet is a chief of a banditti, a very designing and dangerous man from whom the United States and especially this place have everything to dread.” Nathaniel Ewing said much the same. Not only was Prophetstown “peaceable” and “busily employed cultivating their corn of which they have between 100 & 200 acres,” but Ewing also believed that Harrison only governed by “terror and corruption” and that Prophetstown had become his latest victim.⁴

When federal officials began to question Harrison’s leadership, he realized that he had to defend himself. The governor wrote Secretary of War William Eustis and asked him to disregard any charges that his actions toward the Prophet had been “premature and unfounded.” Harrison reminded Eustis that the president was “too just to censure an officer for an unintentional error or to lend a favorable ear to the calumnies” produced by his enemies. Yet such comments reflect Harrison’s fear that he might indeed be removed. Fearful of losing his position as governor, Harrison refused to engage the descriptions of a peaceful Prophetstown and instead promoted its militancy. He demanded that a “decisive and energetic measure [be] adopted to break up the

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³ Harrison to Eustis, August 28, 1810, William Henry Harrison Papers, reel 4, 178-179; Harrison to Governor Charles Scott, December 13, 1811, William Henry Harrison Papers, reel 5, pp. 146-147.
⁴ Badollet to Gallatin, August 6, 1811, Correspondence, 184-186; Ewing to Gallatin, August 6, 1811, Correspondence, 159-164
combination formed by the Prophet” or the United States would soon “have every Indian tribe in this quarter united” against it. Such unity seemed reasonable given that Main Poc, a known follower of the Prophet, had recently attacked American settlements in Illinois. However, Main Poc had initiated those attacks despite the Prophet’s warnings not to do so. Harrison moved to destroy Prophetstown in early September 1811. Ultimately, his actions led to the Battle of Tippecanoe in November 1811 and the destruction of Prophetstown. Harrison pursued the Prophet because he believed that his personal enemies had “united with the British agents in representing that . . . the Prophet [was] one of the best & Most pacific of Mortals.” Without corroboration from the Miamis and French, this was not possible. The intra-ethnic factionalism dividing Vincennes was simply the Euro-American version of the Indian factionalism growing in Miami country.

Why did Harrison believe that the Prophet was such a threat? That answer is bound up in a complicated mess of inter-ethnic and inter-cultural factionalism. Examining the competing ethnic interests in the region allows us to more completely understand the motives of those involved. By expanding our chronology and framing Harrison and the Shawnee Prophet within the history of the Wabash-Maumee Valley, we see the two men, and their communities, as products of regional and historic forces that were well outside their control. Despite decades of marginalization following the Revolutionary War, the French and Miamis identified opportunities and discovered avenues through which they could protect themselves, even if that meant amplifying the threat posed by an Indian community that was also at odds with the Americans. The French and Miamis were simply unwilling to subvert their ethnic and cultural

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5 Harrison to Eustis, July 10, 1811, Papers of William Henry Harrison, reel 4, 630; Harrison to Eustis, Messages and Letters, page 534; Cave, 99.
6 Harrison to Eustis, August 28, 1810, William Henry Harrison Papers, reel 4, 178-179; Harrison to Governor Charles Scott, December 13, 1811, William Henry Harrison Papers, reel 5, pp. 146-147.
identity to a larger racial polity. Even these groups could have allied themselves with Prophetstown in an attempt to stall or redirect American settlement, doing so would have still undermined their cultural foundations.

By 1811, three characterizations of Prophetstown were playing out on the Indiana frontier. The French had used their roles as traders and interpreters to shape the diplomatic atmosphere concerning Prophetstown, albeit in their favor. The Miami added to negative perceptions of the Shawnee town by corroborating French reports of the Prophet’s growing power. They also amplified those negative images through no fault of their own when Miami leaders like Pacanne chose to associate with the British. Americans routinely interpreted such behavior as being a product of the Prophet’s influence since he was doing the exact same thing. Disputes between Little Turtle and Pacanne, which the Americans interpreted through the lens of Prophetstown, complemented fears propagated by Harrison and his supporters that the Prophet was expanding his power base. The French, the Miami, and even the Harrisonians all tried to prove that the Prophet was evil, cunning, and blood-thirsty. On their own, these images of the Prophet and his town were striking but not horribly alarming. Collectively, however, these characterizations of the Prophet and his town demanded action.

3 Cave, Prophets of the Great Spirit, 97. John Johnston to Henry Dearborn, from Fort Wayne May 31, 1807. Potawatomi File, Great lakes Indian Archives; William Wells to WHH, WHH Papers, Reel 3, 380; April 8, 1809. Ibid.

Jay Gitlin, *The Bourgeois Frontier*, 45-57; “French Resolutions,” *The Western Sun*, August 22, 1807; Stout printed a list of the people who defaulted on their taxes in the January 27, 1808 issue of *The Western Sun*. The article also stated that all defaulted accounts would have their land sold that March; Denise Marie Wilson, *Vincennes: From French Colonial Village to American Frontier Town, 1730-1820*. Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, (1997), 244. *The Western Sun* (Vincennes, Indiana), September 3, 1808.


Patrick Griffin, *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and the Revolutionary Frontier* (Hill and Wang, 2008), 10-16.; WHH to Henry Dearborn, *WHH Papers*, March 3, 1805; Reel 2, 104; Ibid, 394. Harrison also believed that Indians could not be trusted, even identify certain groups as “the most perfidious of their race” and Indians on the whole as “blood thirsty savages.” WHH to Dearborn, *WHH Papers*, Reel #3, 113; February 18, 1808; WHH to Indiana Territorial Assembly, *WHH Papers*, October 17, 1809, Reel #3, 583; Eustis routinely agrees with Harrison’s assessments. Regarding the problems at Prophetstown in 1808, Eustis thanked Harrison for the “agreeable information of the dispersion of the hostile Combination of the Savages [Prophetstown] in your vicinity.” Eustis to WHH, Reel #3, 429; 5 June 1809; WHH to Eustis, *WHH Papers*, May 3, 1809, Reel #3, 409; Harrison to Eustis, *WHH Papers*, Reel 3, 669; December 3, 1809. WHH Letters, June 6, 1811, Reel #4, 538. LaPlant was caught
selling merchandise to the Indians without a license in 1808. Thomas Randolph to WHH, July 19th, 1808, Reel #3, 209; WHH to Eustis, April 25, 1810, Reel #3, 827. *WHH Papers*, June 6, 1811, Reel #4, 538.


15 Edmunds, *The Shawnee Prophet*, 80-85; Ibid.


17 Harrison to Eustis, Reel 4, 218; Ibid; Ibid.


21 WHH to Eustis, *WHH Papers*, Reel 4, 040; Ibid; Deposition of Michel Brouillet, Reel 4, 083; Elihu Stout posted a notice in *The Western Sun* which included the stories of the Frenchmen, their estimates of Prophetstown’s military capability, and a statement requiring all citizens of Knox County to attend a meeting “to consult upon the best plan of avoiding the threatened war with the Indians, & of securing their several families.” *Western Sun*, June 23, 1810; Reel 4, 062; Harrison’s speech to the Indiana Legislature (as edited by Stout), *The Western Sun*, June 23, 1810.

22 Harrison’s speech to the Indiana Legislature (as edited by Stout), *The Western Sun*, June 23, 1810; *The Western Sun*, July 7, 1810; John Johnston to WHH, *WHH Papers*, Reel 4, 232, October 14, 1810; John Johnston to WHH, *WHH Papers*, Reel 4, 231, October 14, 1810; John Shaw, Assistant Indian Agent’s Translation, *WHH Papers*, June 1810, Reel 4, 064; WHH to Eustis, *WHH Papers*, July 18, 1810, Reel 4, 103.


24 Elihu Stout’s “Report on Indian Affairs” in *The Western Sun* stated that “the Indians were collecting in very great numbers about the Prophet; that the Miami [no distinction made between the factions] had been so intimidated as to agree to attend his council…” May 1, 1810 – June 22, 1810. *WHH Papers*, Reel 3, 833; Harrison sent a speech to the Miami during August 1811 declaring that “all those who join the [Shawnee] Prophet & his party as hostile and call upon you to fulfil [sic] your engagements.” Message to the Miami, *WHH Papers*, August 21, 1811, Reel #4, 731. Elihu Stout’s coverage of the Shawnee Prophet demonstrates not only his growing paranoia about the Indian threat but the extent to which his readers wanted to understand the situation. *The Western Sun*, June 8, June 22, July 6, and July 13; Harrison to Secretary of War, *Messages and Letters*, December 24, 1810, 497; Harrison to Secretary
25 Harrison to Eustis, October 10, 1810, Reel 4, 227; *The Western Sun*, “Extra” October 18, 1810; Harrison to Eustis, October 17, 1810, Reel 4, 241.